Kagame's Tourism Statistics Are Scary

Kagame's Tourism Statistics Are Scary

Kagame built a US$300 million convention centre to make Kigali an African tourism hub. He has so far managed to host an African Union meeting that brought to Rwanda 4,000+ people and a couple smaller events since.
On 5-6 September 2016, Kagame is hosting the Global African Investment Summit that hopefully might attract 1,000.
To get a better sense of the challenge that lies ahead in making Kigali, and Rwanda a tourist hub, let us look at the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda's 2015 data.
As indicated in the table Rwanda received 1,219,529 visitors as follows:
* 1 million came from Africa by land - mainly from Burundi, DRC Congo, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.
* 35,000 from the Americas;
* 63,000 from Europe;
* 32,000 from elsewhere.
Obviously, the richer tourists with heavy pockets are most likely to be from richer countries in America, Europe and Asia. Shockingly, the total number of the potentially richer tourists that came to Rwanda in 2014 was a mere 130,000.
Ok Mr President, perform a miracle! Make the Kagame Convention Centre pay by making Rwanda a tourist hub. You are evidently starting this mission from a deep hole. You need all the luck.

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David Himbara

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At the Crossroads? The Scission of FDLR in relation to CNRD-Ubwiyunge

What has for long been a fragile cohabitation full of tension inside FDLR finally seems to have reached an ultimate breaking point. Congruent reports suggest the breakaway of a substantial part of a group that hitherto maintained its position as the single most important non-state armed movement in eastern Congo. What do we know about the scission led by Col. Wilson Irategeka (aka Laurent Ndagijimana)?

Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura

To start with some background: All through the last months, the FDLR is further losing strength, with their size ranging roughly around an estimated 1500 elements (this figure should be taken as a rough estimate based on various lower and higher numbers mentioned by various sources). Since late 2015, the still ongoing Sukola II operations of the Congolese army have not only dislodged the militia from its former strongholds (around Ihula), it has also shaken up the group’s internal hierarchy and potentially further undermined its fragile cohesion.

It is not entirely clear to which extent Gen. Sylvestre Mudacumura (aka Bernard Mupenzi), the groups overall military head for many years, maintains full commanding power within the organisation. Given chief of staff Gen. Léopold Mujyambere’s (aka Achille Musenyeri) arrest, this points at increasing clout of Gen. Pacifique Ntawunguka (aka Omega/Israel). The recently concluded trial of the FDLR’s political president Ignace Murwanashyaka (together with Straton Musoni) saw Gen. Victor Byringiro (aka Gaston Iyamuremye/Rumuli) emerge as FDLR’s president ad interim, with Wilson as his de facto deputy. Both are believed to entertain lively animosities towards each other for years, and Victor’s relations to Mudacumura and Omega are evenly reported to be tense at best.

Prior to the onset of Sukola II operations by the Congolese army (which, still, are carried out unilaterally after allegations of human rights abuses of Congolese generals that created a friction between MONUSCO and Kinshasa), a series of voluntary demobilisations had made the news. In three waves, the FDLR leadership tried to show its goodwill by handing over a few hundreds of combatants and a number of arms. Victor and Wilson were both involved in these activities, while certain actors in the military leadership are said to have been more reluctant.

Gen. Victor Byringiro

A more hidden contention, however, has been the way FDLR deals with its ‘dependents’, meaning both the actual dependents and the larger Rwandan refugee population that remains in eastern DRC’s forests since the 1994 Genocide. FDLR has been repeatedly accused of using them as ‘human shields’ and ‘recruitment pool’, but certainly also for economic activities which have traditionally linked civilians and combatants (i.e. the organisation of agricultural production and other revenue generating activities including but also beyond their ‘logistique non-conventionnelle’). Within FDLR’s leadership there has been historic disagreement over how to deal with these populations — both in terms of seeing in them a ‘constituency’ but also thinking of them as a strategic asset. Obviously, there is a thin line here.

At the same time, the refugee issue has a larger connotation: 22 years after most of them have arrived in eastern Congo, it becomes nearly impossible for both the UNHCR and the national refugee commission (CNR) of the DRC to exactly identify who is a refugee, who is a ‘refugee secondo’, who is a displaced rwandophone Congolese, and so on. The political solution aimed at resolving this confusion most recently was to run a biometric census. This is highly problematic, since comparative baseline data is not existing. Hence, if feasible at all, it would be an enormous undertaking, giving the logistic challenges, to have a more or less accurate picture. Attempts in 2015 have, in addition, shown a significant amount of suspicion among the target populations — in certain pilot centres in the Kivus almost no one showed up.

Back to FDLR: within this contestation over the role of refugees, the fault lines between Wilson and Victor consistently grew deeper. Sukola II had — despite its consistent challenges to roll out operations more quickly and decisively — achieved rather remarkable progress in military terms and effectively further weakened FDLR-Foca (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi is the official name of FDLR’s military). It is in this context that we need to situate the comeback of hefty internal discussions over how to deal with the refugees. According to different sources, Wilson was pushing for a more open stance towards identification and census. A possible rationale behind this could be Wilson’s general political strategy towards a ‘decriminalisation’ of FDLR and the attempt of opening up avenues towards a diplomatic solution, incl. potentially third-country resettlement of those leaders not indicted by either ICC or ICTR. Coupled with political ambitions to ‘represent’ the refugees, these dynamics contributed to the most recent internal escalation. This might have been the tipping point having him being suspended by Victor, Omega, Mudacumura, and spokesman LaForge Fils Bazeye, and resulted in Wilson’s defection and the creation of the CNRD-Ubwiyunge under his leadership. In a Kinyarwanda communiqué, FDLR’s South Kivu commander Hamada Habimana is named as the CNRD’s military commander and strong accusations were issued against FDLR’s alleged strategy of ‘human shields’.

 Col. Wilson Irategeka

CNRD-Ubwiyunge would, if confirmed as a politico-military group, be the fourth relevant split-off from FDLR-Foca since its creation in 2000 (following RDR, ALiR I and II) — a meanwhile defunct group called ‘Rastas’ was operating in the early-mid 2000s in South Kivu and FDLR-Soki and RUD-Urunana broke away around 2006/7. While minor remnants of the Soki group still operate in northern Rutshuru territory, only RUD had a larger relevance in the last few years (their military leader Gen. Musare was reported to be killed early 2016 in fighting with, potentially, the NDC-Rénové and UPDI in southern Lubero.

To date, we know little about whether or not Wilson is succeeding to take a considerable number of commanders and troops into his new movement. The (by far smaller) South Kivu branch of FDLR-Foca, according to several sources is, in majority but not wholly, following Wilson. The larger North Kivu branch appears to be more divided. Several important commanders seem to be favourable to Wilson, but key commanders and potentially the groups ‘special forces’ called CRAP are unlikely to turn towards CNRD for their allegiance to Mudacumura and Omega. Voices from within have been stating that ‘a significant part of the combatants and civilians’ were on Wilson’s side, but also that ‘many rank-and-file’ remain ‘highly confused and barely up to date’ regarding the precise fault lines so far.

While international tensions in FDLR are no news anymore, it is surprising (or not) that in a situation of high external pressures to the movement that this scission seems to happen. While that looks logical in the first place, it is interesting to remember that — beyond all dissent — the FDLR had previously often managed to overcome their internal beef whenever the group as such was exposed to existential threats. This time, it might be different.

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What Do you Do When Opposition Dismantles Itself? FDLR, now RNC

"Through the disruptive influence of Lt. Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa and his Tutsi military allies, and the acquiescence of Hutu elements in the Bureau of the Executive Committee, a proposal for the reformed statute of the organization was deemed unimportant and shelved, without giving a chance to the Executive Committee, the Political Bureau and RNC members to discuss it, " Dr Theogene Rudasingwa, the embattled leader of Rwandan National Congress (RNC), one of the main Rwandan opposition parties in exile, said in a statement on July 1st, 2016. According to the same statement Major Dr Rudasingwa , his brother Dr. Gerald Gahima, Joseph Ngarambe and Jonathan Musonera have decided to form a new party, "New-RNC".

Former Comrades, Now on Opposing Camps.

Dr Theogene Rudasingwa was distancing himself from the party he co-founded with Lt Gen Karumba Nyamwasa and the late Colonel Patric Karegeya, about five years ago. Lt Gen. Karumba Nyamwasa, Major Dr. Rudasingwa and Colonel Patrick Karegeya were, arguably, the closest aides to the current Rwandan dictator, General Paul Kagame, before fleeing the country. Once in exile, they accused Paul Kagame of being a dictator and an assassin.

 Lt. Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa

In good days, Major Dr Rudasnigwa was once Rwandan Ambassador to the United States and the Secretary General of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front, Lt. Gen. Nyamwasa was the overall Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Defense Forces, whereas Col Patrick Karegeya was the Intelligence Chief. Over the last 5 years, Lt Gen Nyamwasa, who has been in exile in South Africa, escaped two assassination attempts by Rwandan Intelligence operatives, according to court ruling in South Africa. Col Karegeya was not luck: he was assassinated by Rwandan government operatives in a hotel in an affluent neighbor of Johannesburg, South Africa (see here).

Hence, the disagreement and break-up between Lt General Karumba and Maj Dr Rudasingwa, has sent waves of disappointment across the opposition. On the other side, according to sources close to Rwandan Government, an upbeat sentiment was palpable among the Rwandan ruling party elites, who seemed to predict the end of RNC as a viable opposition movement.

Reacting to Dr Rudasingwa's statement, his former deputy, Jerome Nayigiziki declared himself the new leader of RNC.

FDLR: Another Discord in the Opposition

The dissension with RNC, a civilian opposition party, created by former Rwandan Patriotic Front senior leaders follows another recent break-up within an armed opposition party, the Democratic Liberations Forces of Rwanda, FDLR. FDLR is composed mostly by former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) soldiers and Hutu refugees. Their headquarter is in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

General Victor Byiringiro

A month ago, FDLR vice-president, Col Wilson Irategeka, decided to break away from the FDLR and created his own political party, CNRD-Ubwiyunge. He accused the FDLR president, General Victor Byiringiro of divisive politics, incompetence, and other misdeeds. In turn, General Byiringiro, in a statement published on June 8, 2016, said that the FDLR leadership had in reality dismissed Col Wilson Irategeka for disregard of orders and protocols, divisive politics, being an agent of foreign forces, and making of false and defamatory statements against the leadership and other misdeeds.

A war of statements and counter-statements has ensued and is still on-going.

Dissensions: A Sign of Major Weaknesses in the Rwandan Opposition

These discords among two of the main political opposition parties in Rwanda could not came at wrong moment. The Rwandan dictator General Paul Kagame has decided to change the constitution of his country and seek a forbidden third term, beginning in 2017. The move was condemned by Rwandan opposition and African Western governments. The condemnation had fueled the momentum of Rwandan political parties as they sought to challenge Paul Kagame's decision in 2017.

In fact, as many observed, "Rwanda today has no civic freedom, no free press or political opposition. It is a small country dominated by one leader," (see our article: Rwanda: What Do you Do When People Dismantle Democracy? NPR Asks of June 2016).

The discords appear to reinforce the points. On the other side, other political observers of the Great Lakes Regions of Africa, in general, and Rwanda, in particular appear to see the upheavals as a good opportunity.

"Perhaps, with the conflicts and dissensions within two of the main Rwandan opposition parties in exile, we may see a consolidation of the various factions of the political organizations around a unified platform, with the aim of challenging the Rwandan dictator, " an RNC leader told AfroAmerica Network.

Maybe, maybe not. Currently, Rwandan opposition in exile is divided into two main camps: armed political opposition and civilian political opposition. The armed political opposition is composed of two major parties: FDLR and National Democratic Congress (NDC), with NDC being a coalition of Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD-Urunana) and Rally of the Rwandan People (RPR - Inkeragurabara). RPR is mostly compose of former RPF members and leaders.

The main civilian opposition parties are: RNC, FDU - Inkingi, and PS-Imberakuri

Hence, it appears that the Rwandan opposition has reached the crossroads and is facing a critical choice: Will they or will they not succeed to form a unified political opposition capable of challenging Rwandan Paul Kagame?

Paul Kagame has been trying to use the Rwandan people to dismantle democracy. Now, it appears that the opposition is trying to use itself to dismantle itself.

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CNRD-Ubwiyungu Does not have any Territorial Ambition in the Democractic Republic of Congo

Press release No. 002 / CP / 16.

AA/Lumbumbashi/Heritier Maila

The National Council for Renewal and Democracy (CNRD-Ubwiyunge) is horrified by the misinformation circulating on social media including the website "www.direct.cd" which wrote in on of it’s published article that CNRD-UBWIYUNGE is a movement seeking to destabilize peace in Democractic Republic of Congo.

The CNRD-UBWIYUNGE has taken this oppoturnity to inform the public, the Congolese people and the international community that this information is groundless. Indeed, the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE was found on 31, May 2016 by Rwandan refugees in Democratic Republic of Congo and around the world. The objectives of the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE includes the following:

1. Plead the cause of the Rwandan refugees. Throughout the world but especially those located in the Democratic Republic of Congo. You will notice that CNRD-Ubwiyunge works closely with the Democratic Republic of Congo government institutions, UNHCR, humanitarian NGOs, and many other organisations to ensure that our refugee population are:
   
   A. Recognize
   B. Secured and protected
   C. Receiving Humanitarian Assistance.
    
2. Return dignity to all Rwandan Refugees. We this by working with other opposition parties to pressure the RPF-Inkotanyi regime to open political space and is committed to the path of dialogue with the real political opposition.
3. Create true reconciliation between the ethnic that make up the Rwandan Society. Here we fight all forms of impunity and advocate for a Rwandan society where everyone is equal before the law.

The above mentioned evidence, concludes that , the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE has no territorial ambition in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Instead, it intends to offer its experience to build an enduring peace in the Great Lakes region of Africa, through legal and political means under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Information linking the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE to those who want to destabilize the peace of the Congolese people within harmful propaganda orchestrated by the detractors of the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE. We strongly disagree and we against those lies that are being circulating on social media.

The authors of this article which was published in ‘Direct.Cd’ should exercise intellectual, honesty and seek information from the concerned individuals rather than doing a propagandist press.



Done at Rutchuru, June 26, 2016.

For the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE
Barnabas Sinayobye
Spokesman of the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE (Sé)
Telephone: +243842543221 / + 243824804184

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